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HIS article discusses legislative and judicial developments relating
to the Texas law of intestacy, wills, estate administration, trusts,
and other estate planning matters during the Survey period of No-
vember 2, 2002 through November 1, 2003. The reader is warned that not
all legislation enacted nor cases decided during the Survey period are
presented, and not all aspects of each cited statute or case are analyzed.
You must read and study the full text of each statute or case before rely-
ing on it or using it as precedent. The discussion of most cases includes a
moral that is the important lesson to be learned from the case. By recog-
nizing situations which have led to time-consuming and costly litigation in
the past, the reader may be able to reduce the likelihood of the same





A common-law marriage may be still be established by a partner even
after many years have elapsed since the parties lived together, and even
by the partner who, without first obtaining a divorce, marries another
person as demonstrated by Wilson ex. rel. C.M.W. v. Estate of Williams.1
Intestate and Partner were never married. However, Partner asserted
that they had an informal or "common-law" marriage. Partner testified
that they agreed to marry, lived together, and held each other out as hus-
band and wife. Before Intestate's death, however, Partner moved out
and married another man in a ceremonial marriage without first getting
divorced from Intestate. Approximately four years later, Intestate died
in an industrial accident giving rise to significant wrongful death and sur-
vival claims. The trial court found that Partner was Intestate's surviving
spouse and therefore entitled to inherit from Intestate.2
The appellate court agreed. The court refused to apply the Family
Code provision which was in effect when Partner and Intestate separated
which required an action to establish a common-law marriage to be com-
menced no later than one year after the date on which the relationship
ended. Instead, the court applied current Family Code Section 2.401(b)
in effect at the time of Intestate's death. The Code merely provides a
rebuttable presumption that no common-law marriage exists if no action
to prove the common-law marriage is commenced within two years after
the parties separate and cease living together. The court refused to ex-
amine the sufficiency of the facts establishing the common-law marriage
because they had not been challenged.3
B. NON-MARITAL CHILD
Proof of biological paternity is not necessary for a child to inherit from
his or her father if paternity is otherwise established as shown in Wilson
ex. rel. C.M.W. v. Estate of Williams.4 Wife, while married to Husband,
gave birth to Child. However, Intestate, a person with whom wife had
lived briefly while separated from husband, acknowledged Child as his
son, was named on Child's birth certificate as the father, and signed an
acknowledgment of paternity form. Intestate died in an industrial acci-
dent giving rise to significant wrongful death and survival claims. The
trial court found that Child was Intestate's son and therefore entitled to
inherit from Intestate.5
The appellate court agreed, basing its analysis on the law as it existed
on the date of Intestate's death. Accordingly, Husband was Child's pre-
1. Wilson ex. rel C.M.W. v. Estate of Williams, 99 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. App.-Waco
2003, no pet.).
2. Id. at 642.
3. Id. at 645.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 641-43.
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sumed father. The court examined Intestate's actions of acknowledging
Child, being named on Child's birth certificate, and his signing of the pa-
ternity form. In addition, Wife testified that she did not have sexual rela-
tions with Husband for at least one year before Child's birth. The court
determined that this was clear and convincing evidence which was suffi-
cient to rebut the presumption that Husband was Child's father. The trial
court was within its discretion to give little weight to the possibility that
someone else was the father even though Mother testified that about nine
months before Child's birth, she had sex with a man whose name she
could not recall. The court did not examine a DNA report which may
have shown Intestate was not the father because the report was not prop-
erly offered and thus was not before the court. 6
The court also rejected the argument that Probate Code Section 42(b)
requires a showing of a biological link between Intestate and Child except
for adopted children. The Code provides that "[flor the purpose of inher-
itance, a child is the child of his biological father."'7 The court instead
read the statute as defining who qualifies as a biological father rather
than requiring Child to show an actual biological link to Intestate. 8
II. WILLS
A. TESTAMENTARY INTENT
Client letters and memoranda that indicate provisions which the attor-
ney should include in the will are not themselves wills. To reduce the
chance of controversy, the attorney should consider having clients clearly
mark such documents as "not a will or codicil." In re Estate of Schiwetz9
shows the problems that may arise if this step is not taken. Testatrix's
1992 will was admitted to probate. Later, Beneficiary filed an application
to probate four alleged codicils to the 1992 will. These documents con-
sisted of letters and memoranda to Testatrix's attorney in which Testatrix
listed changes she wanted the attorney to make to her will. The trial
court granted a summary judgment that these documents lacked testa-
mentary intent and thus were not codicils to Testatrix's will.10
The appellate court affirmed. The court held that the documents
clearly and unambiguously lacked testamentary intent. Instead, they
were merely instructions or directions to the attorney to prepare new
wills or codicils that carried out the requested changes. Testatrix did not
intend these actual documents to be wills or codicils."
6. Id. at 645-50.
7. Id. at 649 (quoting TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b) (Vernon 1998)).
8. See id. at 650 (explaining that a man who adopts a child is included in the defini-
tion of biological father).
9. In re Estate of Schiwetz, 102 S.W.3d 355 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, pet.
denied).
10. Id. at 358.
11. See id. at 363-64 (stating that for a document to retain the testamentary intent
required, it must be proven the testator desired that document to be the instrument to




A will proponent must vigorously advocate that a testator had testa-
mentary capacity as it will be difficult to overturn a jury finding of lack of
capacity on appeal. In addition, it is essential for a drafting attorney to
actually meet with the client and be present during the will execution
ceremony. For example, in the case of In re Estate of Blakes,12 approxi-
mately twelve hours before his death, Testator executed his will. The will
left property to various individuals including his natural children, but his
Wife, from whom he had been separated for over a decade, and Stepson
were not named as beneficiaries. Wife convinced the jury that Testator
lacked testamentary capacity and was subject to undue influence when he
executed the will. 13
The appellate court agreed there was sufficient evidence to support the
jury's finding that Testator lacked testamentary capacity. Testator was in
the end stages of cancer and executed the will in his hospital bed. Testi-
mony revealed that Testator often showed signs of confusion after being
admitted to the hospital several days before executing the will. The attor-
ney who prepared the will never spoke with Testator and was not present
during the will execution ceremony. Instead, the attorney drafted the will
based on instructions from a friend. The court recognized there was also
evidence that Testator had testamentary capacity, but the court con-
cluded that the evidence of lack of capacity was not so weak as to make
the jury's finding unjust.1 4
C. SIGNATURE
A signature to a will should be at the end of the document and clearly
reflect the testator's approval of the document as the testator's will to
avoid the problem which arose in the case of In re Estate of Schiwetz. 15 A
document alleged to be a codicil to a will was deemed to lack the testa-
trix's signature. The court held that the indication the document was
"From [Testatrix]" at the top of the page did not operate as a signature.
The name was written to inform the addressee of the source of the docu-
ment rather than to act as a signature. 16
D. SATISFACTION
Texas now has a statute explaining in what instances an inter vivos gift
will be treated as being in satisfaction of a testamentary gift.17 The provi-
sion is analogous to the existing provision dealing with advancements in
12. In re Estate of Blakes, 104 S.W.3d 333 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.).
13. Id. at 335.
14. Id. at 335-37.
15. In re Estate of Schiwetz, 102 S.W.3d 355 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, pet.
denied).
16. Id. at 364.
17. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37C (Vernon Supp. 2004) (applicable only to wills exe-
cuted on or after September 1, 2003).
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an intestacy context. 18 An inter vivos gift will be considered in partial or
total satisfaction of a testamentary gift only if one of the following three
conditions is satisfied:
(1) The testator's will expressly indicates that the inter vivos gift is to
be deducted from the testamentary gift.
(2) The testator declares in a contemporaneous writing that the inter
vivos gift is either (a) to be deducted from the testamentary gift
or (b) is in satisfaction of the testamentary gift.
(3) The beneficiary acknowledges in writing that the inter vivos gift
is in satisfaction of the testamentary gift. 19
The value of property the testator gives in partial satisfaction of a testa-
mentary gift is determined at the earlier of the date when (1) the benefici-
ary acquires possession of or enjoys the property or (2) when the testator
dies. 20
E. CONTRACTUAL WILLS
1. Method of Proof
The methods by which a contractual will may be proved have been
modernized so that the contract may be established by the provisions of a
written agreement that is binding and enforceable as well as the provi-
sions of the will itself.2 1 Prior to this change, a totally valid contract such
as a pre-marital agreement, post-marital agreement, divorce property set-
tlement, or buy-sell agreement could exist, but because it was on a sepa-
rate piece of paper, its establishment was problematic if the will did not
state that a contract existed and list the material provisions of the
contract.
2. Pre-September 1, 1979 Wills
Probate Code Section 59A requiring written evidence of the contract
either in the will itself or, as discussed above, in a binding written agree-
ment, applies only to wills executed on or after September 1, 1979. If an
alleged contractual will is executed before September 1, 1979, the court
may still consider extrinsic evidence in determining the contractual na-
ture of the will. The court will deem the will contractual only if (1) the
gift to the survivor is not absolute and unconditional, even though it may
initially appear to be so and (2) the balance remaining from the estate of
the first to die and estate of the last to die is treated as a single estate and
jointly disposed of by both testators in the secondary dispositive provi-
sions of the will.22
18. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 44 (Vernon 2003) (setting forth situations in which
an advancement is valid).
19. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37c (Vernon Supp. 2004) (applicable only to wills exe-
cuted on or after September 1, 2003).
20. Id.




Older wills are still frequently litigated. In the case of In re Estate of
McFatter,23 the will provided that the survivor would hold the entire es-
tate "as his or her property absolutely" and did not contain a secondary
dispositive provision. Accordingly, the court determined that the will was
not contractual. However, the courts in Lorenz v. Janssen24 and In re
Estate of Osborne25 found that both prongs of the test were satisfied and
thus the wills were contractual. 26
3. Post-September 1, 1979 Wills
In Estate of Hearn v. Hearn,27 Husband and Wife executed reciprocal
wills leaving personal and household effects to the survivor with the re-
siduary passing to an inter vivos trust. After Husband died, Husband's
Children from a prior marriage asserted that Husband and Wife had exe-
cuted contractual wills which would require Wife to fund the trust with
her property immediately upon Husband's death. The trial court granted
Wife's motion for a summary judgment, and held that she was under no
obligation to fund the trust with her property. Children appealed.2 8
The appellate court studied the will and determined that it was contrac-
tual in nature. The will expressly stated that it was contractual, refer-
enced Probate Code Section 59A, and stated the material terms of the
contract. These terms were that each spouse maintain a will that directs
the executor of the first spouse to die to make a qualified terminable
interest property (QTIP) election for property passing into the trust.
However, the contract did not require Wife to maintain her will or trans-
fer her property to the trust upon Husband's death. Instead, the contract
was fully performed when Husband died, and his residuary estate passed
to the trust for which the executor made the QTIP election. 29
F. CONDITIONAL GiFTs
A conditional gift in a will may help a testator achieve important estate
planning goals. For example, in Marion v. Davis,30 Testator imposed a
condition on all gifts in his will and testamentary trust-the share of any
beneficiary who attempted to place Testator's Wife into a nursing home
before all estate assets were exhausted would be forfeited and distributed
23. In re Estate of McFatter, 94 S.W.3d 729 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.).
24. Lorenz v. Janssen, 116 S.W.3d 421 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet. ).
25. In re Estate of Osborne, 111 S.W.3d 218 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. filed).
26. See Lorenz, 116 S.W.3d at 425-26 (stating a contractual will exists because gifts
from the testators were joint and the property of testators was treated as one); In re Estate
of Osborne, 111 S.W.3d at 222-23 (enforcing a contractual will based on the language of the
will); In re Estate of McFatter, 94 S.W.3d at 734 (explaining the will did not meet the second
prong of the two prong requirements to have a contractual will and was therefore not
enforceable).
27. In re Estate of Hearn v. Hearn, 101 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2003, pet. denied).
28. Id. at 659.
29. Id. at 661.
30. Marion v. Davis, 106 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied).
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to the remaining beneficiaries. After Testator died, Beneficiary placed
Wife into a nursing home even though there were sufficient funds in Tes-
tator's estate to continue home care. The trial court held that Beneficiary
had therefore forfeited his share.
The appellate court agreed. The court rejected various assertions by
Beneficiary. First, the court held the condition was not against public
policy. There was no evidence to support Beneficiary's claim that the
estate lacked sufficient funds to care for Wife at home. Second, the court
did not think it was relevant that Beneficiary used his authority as Wife's
court-appointed guardian to place her in the nursing home. Third, the
court refused to find that Wife, out of necessity, had to be placed in a
nursing home merely because a doctor advised Beneficiary to do so.
Fourth, the court held that it would be irrelevant even if Beneficiary
could prove he acted in good faith when he placed Wife in the nursing
home. 31
G. PRETERMITTED CHILDREN
The 2003 legislature clarified the law governing pretermitted children.
A specified method is used to determine the share of a pretermitted child
if the testator made a "provision" for a non-pretermitted child in the will.
The amendment provides that the testator's provision may be either
vested or contingent. 32
H. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
1. "Cash" and "Money in Any Financial Institution"
A will drafter must be careful in selecting will language to make certain
the testator's intent is carried out as shown by In re Estate of Dillard.33
Testatrix's will provided that her personal property, except for "cash, cer-
tificates of deposit, and money in any financial institution" would pass
outright to Husband.34 The excepted property went into a trust. Testa-
trix died owning stocks, bonds, and partnership interests. The trial court
held that these items were included in the excepted property and passed
to the trust. Husband appealed. 35
The appellate court reversed. The court construed the phrase "cash,
certificates of deposit, and money in financial institutions" to encompass
coins, paper money, checks, and demand deposits only, and not stocks,
bonds, or partnership interests.36 The court recognized that circum-
stances surrounding the execution of the will or some other provision of
the will could perhaps require a different construction but found there
31. Id. at 866-68.
32. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 67(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004) (effective only with regard to
testators who die on or after September 1, 2003).
33. In re Estate of Dillard, 98 S.W.3d 386 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2003, pet. denied).
34. Id. at 392.
35. Id. at 390.
36. Id. at 392.
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was no such evidence in this case. The court engaged in an extensive
discussion of surrounding circumstances justifying its conclusion as well
as citing to the landmark Texas Supreme Court case of San Antonio Area
Foundation v. Lang37 in which the court held that extrinsic evidence may
not be used to create an ambiguity if the language has a settled legal
meaning. 38
2. Res Judicata
Regardless of how much time has elapsed after a probate decision was
rendered, someone may attempt to set it aside. The doctrine of res judi-
cata will often be available to stop a relitigation of a finally-adjudicated
claim as in Lorenz v. Janssen.39 Husband and Wife executed a joint will
in 1941 providing for the survivor to receive a life estate in all the prop-
erty with a life estate passing to their children upon the survivor's death.
The remainder passed to the "natural children" of Husband and Wife's
children. In 1956, the court declared that two children adopted by
Daughter ("Adopted Grandchildren") would not qualify as "natural chil-
dren" and thus would not share in the remainder of the estate. Wife died
in 1970 and the 1941 will was again probated with specific reference to
the 1956 court action. Accordingly, when Daughter died in 1986 her in-
terest passed to her surviving siblings instead of Adopted Grandchildren.
In the present action, Adopted Grandchildren seek to set aside the 1956
judgment and the order admitting Wife's will to probate. The trial court
rejected Adopted Grandchildren's claims. 40
The appellate court affirmed. The court held the 1956 declaratory
judgment was res judicata and thus precluded Adopted Grandchildren's
claims. The court determined that the court which rendered the 1956
judgment had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Adopted
Grandchildren's rights because the 1941 will was contractual. The 1941
will was contractual because it (1) did not give the survivor an absolute or
unconditional gift, and (2) the remaining estate of the first to die and the
estate of the last to die was treated as a single estate and jointly disposed
of by both testators in the secondary dispositive provisions of the will.41
3. Rights of Life Tenant
A person devising a life estate should clearly indicate the rights of the
life tenant and the remainder beneficiaries to avoid disputes between the
life tenant and the remainder beneficiaries. Nonetheless, litigation may
still occur as in Singleton v. Donalson.42 Testatrix devised a life estate in
real property to her husband (Life Tenant) with the balance passing to
37. San Antonio Area Found. v. Lang, 35 S.W.3d 636 (Tex. 2000).
38. In re Estate of Dillard, 98 S.W.3d at 392-94.
39. Lorenz v. Janssen, 116 S.W.3d 421 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.).
40. Id. at 423-24.
41. Id. at 425-26.
42. Singleton v. Donalson, 117 S.W.3d 516 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2003, pet. denied).
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named relatives (Remainder Beneficiaries) upon his death. Remainder
Beneficiaries asserted that Life Tenant breached his duties by consuming
and using the royalties and bonuses received from oil and gas produced
on the real property. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor
of Life Tenant and the appellate court affirmed.43
The court recognized that oil and gas royalties and bonuses are usually
considered corpus. However, Testatrix's will clearly showed that she in-
tended to grant Life Tenant the right to consume and dispose of the roy-
alties and bonuses. The court focused on the language Testatrix used to
grant the life estate. She expressly included "fee, surface, minerals, royal-
ties;" indicated that Life Tenant was "to enjoy the use and benefits ...,
including the income" of the property; and permitted Life Tenant to use
these benefits "as he sees fit."
44
I. POWER OF APPOINTMENT
The 2003 legislature clarified whether a residuary clause will be
deemed to exercise a power of appointment held by the testator. 45 A
residuary clause or a clause purporting to dispose of all of the testator's
property will exercise a power of appointment in favor of the will benefi-
ciary only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied:
(1) [T]he testator makes a specific reference to the power [of ap-
pointment] in the will.
(2) [T]here is some other indication in a writing [(but not necessarily
the will itself)] that the testator intended to include the property
subject to the power [of appointment] in the will.46
J. IN TERROREM PROVISION
A no-contest provision, also called an in terrorem or forfeiture clause,
provides that a beneficiary who contests the will loses at least some, and
typically all, of the benefits given under the will. Although these provi-
sions are valid and enforceable, they are unpopular with the courts and
are strictly construed. Courts avoid forfeiture unless the beneficiary's
conduct comes squarely within the conduct the testator prohibited in the
will. For example, in Ferguson v. Ferguson,47 two beneficiaries each
claimed the other violated the will provision when they took various ac-
tions. These actions included filing a complaint against the executor's in-
ventory, appraisement, and list of claims, and filing a petition for a
declaratory judgment. Both the trial and appellate courts held that the
actions of these beneficiaries did not violate the in terrorem clause be-
43. Id. at 517.
44. Id. at 517-19.
45. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 58c (Vernon Supp. 2004) (applicable only to wills
executed on or after September 1, 2003) (explaining the two situations in which a power of
appointment may be exercised through a residuary clause).
46. Id.
47. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 111 S.W.3d 589 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied).
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cause neither action was intended to challenge Testator's dispositive plan.
Instead, one action was to ascertain whether the inventory properly dis-
tinguished between Testator's community and separate property and the
other was to interpret the terms of a settlement agreement. 48
Likewise, in the case of In re Estate of Schiwetz,49 the court concluded
that Beneficiary's attempt to probate the alleged codicils, which were ex-
ecuted subsequent to the will, was not a will contest. The court explained
that to hold otherwise would in effect declare that the original will to be
irrevocable. Testatrix's will was, by its very nature, ambulatory, meaning
that Testatrix could revoke or change the will as long as she had the ca-
pacity to do so.50
K. WILL CONTESTS-GENERALLY
1. Joinder of or Notice to Beneficiaries
Continued controversy exists whether will contestants need to join or
give notice to will beneficiaries. In Wojcik v. Wesolick,51 a will contest
was filed because the will physically had holes cut in it suggesting that
beneficiaries were literally "cut out" of the will. In addition, one of the
beneficiary's names was in a different color ink, perhaps indicating it was
added by someone other than the Testator. Testator's estate asserted that
Probate Code Section 93 precluded the will contest because the contes-
tants did not join all of the beneficiaries of the will within two years of the
admission of the will to probate, and the beneficiaries were necessary and
indispensable parties under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 39. The trial
court agreed.52
The appellate court reversed. The court examined Probate Code Sec-
tion 93 and held that this section does not require joinder of all interested
persons in a will contest. The Code does not expressly provide that will
contestants must join or give notice of the will contest to any party. In
addition, Rule 39 is not applicable because it conflicts with the unambigu-
ous language of the Probate Code.53 Note that the vast majority of states
do require will contestants to give notice to interested parties, and this
decision is in conflict with cases from two other districts. 54
48. Id. at 598-99.
49. In re Estate of Schiwetz, 102 S.W.3d 355 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, pet.
denied).
50. Id. at 365-66.
51. Wojcik v. Wesolick, 97 S.W.3d 335 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no
pet.).
52. Id. at 336-37.
53. Id. at 337-38.
54. See, e.g., Kotz v. Kotz, 613 S.W.2d 760, 761 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1981, no




2. Attorney's Fees of Losing Contestant
Ray v. McFarland55 shows that a contestant attempting to probate a
second will is likely to have a difficult time setting aside a jury finding
that the probate action was not brought in good faith and with just cause.
Beneficiary probated Will Two. Contestant attempted to probate Will
One, alleging that Will Two was invalid because of lack of capacity or
undue influence. The jury determined that Testatrix had capacity and
was not unduly influenced. In addition, the jury determined that Contest-
ant's attempt to probate Will One was not done in good faith and with
just cause. Consequently, Contestant would not be entitled to attorney's
fees under Probate Code Section 243. The court, however, granted Con-
testant's request for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (n.o.v.) find-
ing that Contestant did act in good faith and with just cause.
Accordingly, the court permitted Contestant to recover attorney's fees
from the estate. Beneficiary appealed.56
The appellate court reversed. The court reviewed the evidence and
found it was sufficient to support the jury's finding that Contestant's ac-
tions were not in good faith. For example, Contestant had inappropri-
ately taken Testatrix's money and other property by abusing a power of
attorney Testatrix had given Contestant. Accordingly, the trial court
erred when it granted a judgment n.o.v. 57
3. Statute of Limitations
A will proponent should timely (within two years) attempt to probate a
will if the proponent is dissatisfied that another will has already been ad-
mitted to probate. 5s Failure to do so may cause problems as in Stovall v.
Mohler.59 Decedent died in 1996. On March 24, 1997, a document pur-
portedly to be Decedent's 1993 will, was admitted to probate. Daughter
contested the will asserting that it was a forgery and that an earlier will,
from 1986 or 1989, should be probated instead. Granddaughter was
joined as a party and later non-suited from the case. On February 22,
1999, the court determined the will was a forgery and that the other two
wills did not exist. Accordingly, Decedent died intestate. In 2000,
Granddaughter filed an application to probate the 1986 will or, in the
alternative, the 1989 will. Daughter obtained a summary judgment that
Granddaughter's action was precluded as a matter of law under Probate
Code Sections 73 and 93. Granddaughter appealed. 60
The appellate court affirmed. Granddaughter argued that the two year
period to contest a will found in Probate Code Section 93 did not apply as
55. Ray v. McFarland, 97 S.W.3d 728 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).
56. Id. at 729.
57. Id. at 730.
58. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 93 (Vernon 2003) (stating any interested person may
bring suit to contest a will's validity during the two year period after a will is probated).
59. Stovall v. Mohler, 100 S.W.3d 424 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied).
60. Id. at 425-26.
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the 1993 will was not actually admitted to probate because it was later
found to be a forgery. The court rejected this argument and determined
that the language in Section 93, which provides that the limitation runs
"after a will has been admitted to probate," applied because the 1993 will
was technically admitted to probate even though it was later found to be
invalid.61 The fact that the 1993 will was later determined to be a forgery
did not negate the fact it was initially admitted to probate. 62
L. UNDUE INFLUENCE
A will contestant alleging undue influence must have enough evidence
to raise a fact issue to withstand a proponent's motion for summary judg-
ment. For example, in In re Estate of Butts,63 Contestants allege that Tes-
tatrix's will was the product of undue influence. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of Proponents, and the appellate court
affirmed. 64
The court began its analysis with a discussion of the elements of undue
influence and the basic principles which apply when a court determines
whether undue influence was exerted. The court then focused on the acts
of each person (Catherine, Evelyn, and Deborah) who allegedly unduly
influenced Testatrix. Contestants admitted they had no evidence sup-
porting their allegations against Catherine. Evelyn may have had the op-
portunity to exert undue influence, but "mere opportunity is not
sufficient to establish undue influence. ' 65 Likewise, the fact that she ar-
ranged for a notary and the witnesses for the will did not prove undue
influence, especially since the attorney who prepared the will testified
that Testatrix had capacity and explained the reasons behind the disposi-
tive provisions of her will. Deborah did not even benefit from Testatrix's
will, and her conduct was consistent with her role as Testatrix's friend.66
M. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH INHERITANCE RIGHTS
The lower courts of Texas have recognized the tort of tortious interfer-
ence with inheritance rights. 67 However, the courts have not delineated
exactly what actions would constitute tortious interference. Taking an
61. Id. at 427 (quoting TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 93 (Vernon Supp. 2001)).
62. Stovall, 100 S.W.3d at 429.
63. In re Estate of Butts, 102 S.W.3d 801 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2003, pet. denied).
64. Id. at 805.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 803-05.
67. See, e.g., King v. Acker, 725 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no
writ) (holding that because the power of attorney was not signed by King, sufficient evi-
dence existed to find tortious interference); Suprise v. Dekock, 84 S.W.3d 378, 380 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet. (quoting King, 725 S.W.2d at 754) (explaining that
"[any intentional invasion of, or interference with, property, property rights, personal
rights or personal liberties causing injury without just cause or excuse is an actionable
tort"); Brandes v. Rice Trust, Inc., 966 S.W.2d 144, 146 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist]
1998, pet. denied) (reiterating the holding in King which provides for the existence of a
tortious interference with a person's right to inheritance).
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opposite approach, the 2003 legislature declared certain specified actions
may not be considered tortious interference. Specifically, "the filing or
contesting in probate court of any pleading relating to a decedent's estate
[will] not constitute tortious interference with the inheritance of the
estate.'"68
N. TAX APPORTIONMENT
As Rosen v. Wells Fargo Bank Texas69 emphasizes, a testator who
wishes probate assets to bear the transfer tax burden must expressly indi-
cate that even non-residuary probate assets are to be used to pay taxes.
Testator's will provided for all transfer taxes to "be paid out of the resi-
due of my estate without apportionment. ' 70 However, there was no re-
siduary property. Consequently, a dispute arose over whether (1) other
probate assets should shoulder the transfer tax burden or (2) transfer
taxes should be apportioned under Probate Code Section 322A. The pro-
bate court ordered all transfer taxes be paid solely from the probate
assets.
71
The appellate court reversed. The lack of a residuary estate negated
Testator's direction, and thus, the default apportionment provisions of
Probate Code Section 322A still applied. Therefore, the probate assets
qualifying for the marital deduction did not incur any estate tax burden,
and the taxable non-probate assets bore the entire estate tax liability. 72
A strong dissent argued that Testator actually had a residuary estate
which passed under the marital trust provisions of the will. In addition, it
was clear that Testator was extremely concerned with transfer taxes being
paid "without apportionment" as well as with having them paid out of the
residuary. The majority, in effect, ignored Testator's desires not to have
taxes apportioned merely because the named gift was insufficient.73
III. ESTATE ADMINISTRATION
A. VENUE
Proper venue for an action by or against a personal representative for
personal injury, death, or property damages will now be determined
under the Civil Practice & Remedies Code.74 This change may be a codi-
fication of the holding in Reliant Energy, Inc. v. Gonzalez.75 Because the
68. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 10C (Vernon Supp. 2004).
69. Rosen v. Wells Fargo Bank, 114 S.W.3d 145 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no pet.).
70. Id. at 148.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 151-52.
73. See id. at 158 (Mack, J., dissenting) (explaining that it is the duty of the courts to
determine intent from the words actually used in the will and not by speculating about
their meaning).
74. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.007 (Vernon Supp. 2004) (applicable only to
actions filed on or after September 1, 2003).




amendment only discusses venue, however, uncertainty still remains re-
garding jurisdiction. In addition, the courts could broadly interpret the
phrase "property damages" to cover all sorts of injury to the value of
property not just those caused by a tort such as a motor vehicle accident
(e.g., breach of fiduciary duty).
B. APPEAL
1. Finality of Appealed Judgment
A person dissatisfied with a final order of a trial court should timely file
a notice of appeal as reflected by In re Estate of Padilla.76 The appellate
court held that a Decree of Partition and Distribution was a final, appeal-
able judgment. The court applied the test set forth in Crowson v.
Wakeham,77 and indicated that the order was final because it disposed of
each issue raised in the pleadings. The order addressed all of the relief
sought and identified the persons entitled to the estate and the shares of
each. The court then refused to hear the merits of the appeal because the
notice of appeal was untimely filed, and thus, the appellate court had no
jurisdiction to hear the appeal.78
2. Supersedeas Bond
In re Shore79 demonstrates that an executor should file a supersedeas
bond if the result of the appeal would impact the amount of estate prop-
erty the executor will receive. Executor was dissatisfied with a county
court order regarding the partition and distribution of the estate of which
Executor was also a beneficiary. The order did not award Executor all of
the property to which he believed he was entitled. Consequently, he ap-
pealed the judgment but neglected to file a supersedeas bond. The other
beneficiaries filed a motion to force Executor to comply with the order.
Executor then filed a mandamus proceeding to stop the judge from en-
forcing the order.80
The resolution of this case turned on the application of Section 29 of
the Probate Code which dispenses with the appellate bond when an exec-
utor appeals a lower court decision unless the appeal personally concerns
the executor. The appellate court refused to issue mandamus because the
appeal involved the amount of money Executor would personally obtain
as a result of the final distribution of the estate. Accordingly, bond was
required. 8'
76. In re Estate of Padilla, 103 S.W.3d 563 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.).
77. Crowson v. Wakeham, 897 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1995).
78. In re Estate of Padilla, 103 S.W.3d at 566.
79. In re Shore, 106 S.W.3d 817 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.).
80. Id. at 818.
81. See id. at 818-21 (explaining that Shore must file a supersedeas bond to preclude




If a person is dissatisfied with the characterization of property listed on
an estate inventory, a timely appeal of the court's approval of the inven-
tory should be filed. For example, in Garner v. Long,8 2 the probate court
approved the inventory of the decedent's estate which listed certain prop-
erty as the community property of the decedent and his predeceased
spouse. Later, the executor of the decedent's predeceased wife at-
tempted to show this property was actually the predeceased spouse's sep-
arate property. The appellate court agreed with the executor that the
probate court's approval of the inventory did not conclusively determine
the character of the property. However, the approval did act as prima
facie evidence of the property's character. The court examined the pro-
bate court's approval and concluded that it was a final, appealable order.
The executor of the predeceased spouse's estate did not timely appeal
this order, and thus, it was final, binding, and no longer contestable. 83
D. SURVIVAL ACTION
Lorentz v. Dunn84 shows the importance of a person who anticipates
bringing a survival action to have a personal representative appointed
prior to filing suit. Days before the statute of limitations was to run on
Decedent's negligence claim, Administrator filed to be appointed as De-
cedent's personal representative. Before being appointed, Administrator
filed a survival action falsely stating that she had already been properly
appointed by the court. Administrator was later appointed but by that
time, the statute of limitations had already run. The trial court dismissed
the survival action because Administrator did not have standing when she
filed the case.8 5
The appellate court affirmed. Section 71.021 of the Civil Practice &
Remedies Code provides standing for survival actions to the personal
representative and, in some cases, an heir. Administrator was not an heir
and had not yet been appointed either at the time she filed the survival
action or when the statute of limitations had run. The court indicated
that her standing once being appointed did not relate back to the time of
filing.86
E. APPRAISERS
Overturning the appointment of an appraiser is difficult. Thus, a per-
sonal representative should communicate carefully with the court at the
82. Garner v. Long, 106 S.W.3d 260 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).
83. Id. at 263-66.
84. Lorentz v. Dunn, 112 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. filed). See
generally Lovato v. Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc., 113 S.W.3d 45 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no
pet.) (considering an appeal from a summary judgment order for lack of standing to file a
survival action).
85. Lorentz, 112 S.W.3d at 177-78.
86. Id. at 179.
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time of probate regarding whether an appraiser is actually needed so that
the court and the personal representative are "on the same page." In
Nadolney v. Taub,87 the order admitting Testator's will to probate ap-
pointed Appraiser. Executrix later objected to Appraiser's request for a
$35,000 retainer. Appraiser secured a court order directing Executrix to
pay $30,000 directly to Appraiser or into the registry of the court. Execu-
trix elected to pay the money into the court's registry. Later, Executrix
filed a bill of review under Section 31 of the Probate Code seeking either
to obtain a fair, market-based fee agreement with Appraiser or to have
another appraiser appointed. The original judge recused himself. At the
hearing, there was testimony showing Appraiser was appointed because
the judge believed the estate to be taxable when in reality, the estate,
although large, was structured to avoid federal estate tax. The court
granted the bill of review and explained there was no reason for the ap-
pointment of an appraiser in this case. In a separate cause, the court
permitted Executrix to retrieve the funds she had paid into the court's
registry. Appraiser appealed.8 8
The court engaged in an extensive discussion of the bill of review pro-
cedure. Then, the court examined Section 248 of the Probate Code which
provides that the trial court must appoint an appraiser either (1) upon
application of an interested party or (2) if the court deems it necessary.
Since no one applied for the appointment of an appraiser, the appellate
court focused on whether the trial court committed substantial error
when it deemed the appointment of an appraiser to be necessary. The
court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's
appointment of an appraiser. For example, Executrix would need to
know the value of real property to properly fund the by-pass trust. How-
ever, the court also held that since the administration was independent
under Section 145 of the Probate Code, it had no authority to order Exec-
utrix to pay an advanced appraisal fee to Appraiser or the court's regis-
try. Appraiser would be a claimant against the estate and should proceed
as a creditor.8 9
F. REMEDY FOR IMPROPER SALE
As litigation proceeded to demonstrate Executrix's gross mismanage-
ment of estate property in the case of In re Estate of Hernandez,90 the
trial court judge ordered that a parcel of real property not be sold at this
time. Nonetheless, Executrix sold the parcel to her son. The trial court
set aside this sale even without a specific request to do so. Executrix
appealed.9 1
87. Nadolney v. Taub, 116 S.W.3d 273 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet.
filed).
88. Id. at 276-78.
89. Id. at 280-81, 283-84.
90. In re Estate of Hernandez, 112 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2003, pet. denied).
91. See id. at 306-07 (explaining the appeal is based on claims of lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and violations of due process).
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The appellate court affirmed. The court rejected Executrix's claim that
the court must base its order on a specific request to set aside the sale.
The court discussed Section 352 of the Probate Code which prohibits this
type of sale and concluded the section does not require any specific form
as long as it is filed in the appropriate court and a hearing is held with
adequate proof before the court sets aside the sale. The court also re-
jected Executrix's claim that she was being deprived of property without
due process of law. She did not have an interest in the property sold to
her son unless, as was alleged, she was actually the indirect purchaser of
the property in violation of the statute. Likewise, the court rejected the
argument that Executrix's son had to be joined as a party.92
G. CREDITORS OF ESTATE
1. Attorney's Fees of Unsuccessful Will Proponent
Attorney's fees and costs awarded to a person who in good faith and
with just cause attempts to have a will admitted to probate under Section
243 of the Probate Code are now included with other administration ex-
penses as a Class 2 claim. 93 This change increases the likelihood of attor-
neys receiving payment for their services if the estate is insolvent.
In Hope v. Baumgartner,94 Testator's 1995 will was admitted to pro-
bate. Contestant asserted that the 1995 will was invalid because Testator
lacked testamentary capacity and was subject to undue influence. Con-
testant offered Testator's 1972 will for probate in which he was a named
beneficiary. The court determined that the 1995 will was valid. Contest-
ant was awarded $91,000 in attorney's fees under Section 243 of the Pro-
bate Code. A dispute then arose regarding the proper classification of
Contestant's claim under Section 322 of the Probate Code, that is, is it a
Class 2 claim (administration expenses) or a Class 8 claim (all other
claims)? The trial court determined that it was a Class 2 claim.95
Recognizing that this issue was one of first impression in Texas, the
appellate court reversed holding that the claim belongs in Class 8. The
claim did not fit in Class 2 because it was not incurred to preserve, safe
keep, or manage the estate. Instead, Contestant's expenses resulted in a
burden to the estate and were incurred not for the estate's benefit but
rather in an attempt to achieve an outcome favorable to him personally.9 6
As discussed above, Section 322 (Class 2) was amended by the 2003
Texas Legislature. However, it is problematic whether this amendment
would change the result in Hope. It is true that the amendment adds the
phrase "including fees and expenses awarded under Section 243 of this
code."'97 However, the limitation in the prior clause still remains. That is,
92. Id. at 307-08.
93. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 322 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
94. Hope v. Baumgartner, 111 S.W.3d 775 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).
95. Id. at 776-77.
96. Id. at 778.
97. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 322 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
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that the expenses be "incurred in the preservation, safekeeping, and man-
agement of the estate. '98 The court in Hope found that the expenses of
the contestant resulted "in a burden to the estate and not preservation of
it." 99 Accordingly, a court could still interpret the section in such a way
to deny Class 2 classification. Class 2 classification would have been
more likely if the legislature had used the word "and" rather than "in-
cluding." The term "and" would have eliminated the restrictions of
"preservation, safekeeping, and management" with regard to Section 243
fees and expenses while the term "including" retains those restrictions.
2. Delinquent Property Taxes
A taxing entity attempting to collect delinquent ad valorem taxes which
elects to file a claim in probate court in a dependent administration
should timely bring suit if the claim is rejected either expressly or by op-
eration of law. The ramifications of failing to do so are demonstrated by
Andrews v. Aldine Independent School District.100 School District filed a
probate claim for delinquent ad valorem taxes in a dependent administra-
tion. Executor took no action for six months. School District then posted
the properties for foreclosure sale. Executor asserted that School Dis-
trict's claims were barred by limitation because School District did not
file suit within ninety days after its claim was rejected by operation of law
under Sections 310 and 313 of the Probate Code. The trial court rejected
this argument and Executor appealed. 10 1
The appellate court reversed. The court reviewed Section 5C of the
Probate Code governing actions to collect delinquent property taxes. Be-
cause School District presented a claim against the estate, it was subject
to the rules governing the enforcement of claims in probate proceedings
under Section 5C(d)(1). Accordingly, because Executor took no action
on School District's claim, it was deemed rejected after thirty days under
Section 310. School District then had nine days to bring suit under Sec-
tion 313. Because School District failed to do so, School District's claim
was barred. The court rejected a variety of School District's arguments
including that Section 5C was unconstitutional under Article VIII, Sec-
tion 10 as an impermissible legislative act releasing a citizen from the
payment of county taxes.102
H. LATE PROBATE
If a beneficiary discovers the existence of a will more than four years
after the testator's death, that beneficiary should attempt to probate the
will and claim that he or she was not in default. The beneficiary should
98. Id.
99. Hope, 111 S.W.3d at 778.
100. Andrews v. Aldine Indep. Sch. Dist., 116 S.W.3d 407 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
101. Id. at 409.
102. Id. at 410-12.
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not rely on someone else to probate the will who may be found to be in
default as shown by In re Estate of Williams.10 3 Testator died in 1980.
However, it was not until 1998 that one of the beneficiaries attempted to
probate the will as a muniment of title. Beneficiary asserted that he was
not "in default" under Section 73(a) of the Probate Code for waiting
more than four years after the testator's death and thus was entitled to a
late probate. He asserted that he was unaware of the will's existence un-
til 1998 and then acted promptly to offer the will for probate. Evidence
showed, however, that Beneficiary always knew about the will and even
had custody of the will until 1992. Nonetheless, the trial court admitted
the will to probate. 104
The appellate court reversed. The court held that Beneficiary was in
default because he knew about the will and had kept it in his safety de-
posit box. The court also held that the potential "not in default" status of
other will beneficiaries was irrelevant because these beneficiaries did not
apply to probate the will even though they knew Beneficiary was at-
tempting to do so.10 5
I. SETT-LEMENT AGREEMENTS
Settlement agreements need to be properly structured and reviewed.
The agreement should be drafted so that it is neither underinclusive nor
overbroad. For example, in Ferguson v. Ferguson,'10 6 Husband devised to
Wife the marital home which was Husband's separate property. Contro-
versy arose regarding the classification of other assets as Husband's com-
munity property or separate property. The parties reached a settlement
in which Wife received a sum of money in exchange for giving up all
other claims against Husband's estate. Thereafter, the executor de-
manded that Wife leave the marital home asserting that she had agreed to
relinquish all claims to Husband's property. The trial court found that
the settlement agreement covered the marital home and ordered Wife to
vacate.1 0 7
The appellate court carefully reviewed the settlement agreement and
held as a matter of law that the agreement did not impact the devise of
the marital home to Wife, especially since there had never been any prior
controversy regarding Wife's ownership of the home under the terms of
the will. In dicta, the court indicated that even if the marital home had
been covered by the agreement, Wife would still have her constitutional
and statutory homestead rights to use and occupy the property because
103. In re Estate of Williams, 111 S.W.3d 259 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.).
104. Id. at 260.
105. Id. at 263-64.
106. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 111 S.W.3d 589 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied).
See also Smith v. Smith, 112 S.W.3d 275, 281 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, pet. denied)
(considering whether there was sufficient evidence to establish substantial performance
based on the terms and conditions listed in a settlement agreement).
107. Ferguson, 111 S.W.3d at 591-93.
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there was no evidence that she intended to waive those rights. 10 8
J. REINSTATEMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE AFTER REMOVAL
The clerk must now also give notice to the successor representative of
the decedent's estate if a personal representative who is removed seeks
reinstatement. '0 9
K. UNQUALIFIED COMMUNITY ADMINISTRATION
Coleman v. Winn-Coleman, Inc.110 shows that a surviving spouse who is
the sole heir to the community property need not first obtain a judicial
declaration of heirship to recover community property when no one has
been appointed as the personal representative of the deceased spouse's
estate. Intestate died survived by Wife and their two children. No ad-
ministration was opened for Intestate's estate. One of the assets in Intes-
tate's estate was a promissory note on which he was the named payee.
Wife sued to collect the note asserting the note was community property
and that she had the right to recover on the note as the unqualified com-
munity administrator of Intestate's estate under Section 160 of the Pro-
bate Code. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
makers of the note because no court had yet declared Wife as Intestate's
heir in an heirship proceeding."1
The appellate court reversed. The court explained that under Section
45 of the Probate Code, all community property passed to Wife because
all of Intestate's descendants were also descendants of the surviving
spouse. In this situation, Section 155 of the Probate Code states that no
administration of community property is necessary. Section 160 of the
Probate Code then provides that the surviving spouse has the power to
sue for the recovery of community property and to collect claims due to
the community estate unless someone has qualified as the administrator.
Accordingly, Wife had the authority to sue the makers of the promissory
note.112
L. RE-LETtERING OF PROBATE CODE SECTION 84
For decades, Section 84 of the Probate Code has had two subsections
labeled "(b)"-one dealing with proof of a non-self-proved attested writ-
ten will and the second addressing proof of a holographic will. At long
last, the 2003 legislature has provided unique letters to these
subsections.11 3
108. Id. at 596, 598.
109. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 222A (Vernon Supp. 2004).
110. Coleman v. Winn-Coleman, Inc., 110 S.W.3d 104 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2003, no pet.).
111. Id. at 107.
112. Id. at 108-10.
113. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 84 (Vernon Supp. 2004) (describing proof required
for various will forms).
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M. REMOVAL OF OUTDATED GUARDIANSHIP LANGUAGE
Since the legislature severed the decedent estate and guardianship pro-
visions a decade ago, vestiges of guardianship language remained in Sec-
tions 222A and 245 of the Probate Code. The 2003 legislature removed
this outdated language. 114
N. ESTATE AS LEGAL ENTITY
Litigants must remember that an estate is not a legal entity and to
name the personal representative of the decedent as the party. For exam-
ple, in Miller v. Estate of Self,' 5 Plaintiff named the "estate of Decedent"
as the defendant in a lawsuit. The petition was served on Administrator
of Decedent's estate. After a verdict against Decedent was rendered in
the case, Administrator moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and the
trial court granted the motion. Plaintiff appealed.' 1 6
The appellate court affirmed. The court began its analysis with the ba-
sic, albeit often overlooked, rule that the estate of a decedent is not a
legal entity which may sue or be sued. Plaintiff argued that the estate had
waived the issue. The court, however, reasoned that since there was no
legal entity named in the suit, there was no one who could waive any
defect therein. 117
Plaintiff next argued the dismissal was improper because Administra-
tor participated in the lawsuit. The court recognized that if a personal
representative is served and participates in the suit in a representative
capacity, the resulting judgment is valid even though it names the estate.
However, the court found that although Administrator was served, he did
not actually participate in the lawsuit as Plaintiff alleged. Plaintiff did not
attend the trial, and no documents were filed either by him or on his
behalf in the case.' 1 8
IV. TRUSTS
A. TRUST INTENT
Barrientos v. Nava' 19 demonstrates the extent to which courts are will-
ing to reach to find that a person created a trust, especially if the benefi-
ciaries are minor children. The final decree of divorce required Ex-
Husband to name Children as beneficiaries of a life insurance policy and
Ex-Wife as the trustee. Ex-Husband did not comply. Instead, he desig-
114. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 222A(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004) (describing reinstate-
ment of personal representatives after removal); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 245 (Vernon
Supp. 2004) (discussing when a personal representative is responsible for costs of removal
and attorney's fees).
115. Miller v. Estate of Self, 113 S.W.3d 554 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.).
116. Id. at 556.
117. Id. at 556-57.
118. Id. at 557-58.




nated his parents to receive the proceeds outright upon his death. Ex-
Husband also had various benefits payable at his death through his em-
ployer. He named his Sister as trustee of these proceeds for the benefit
of Children. After Ex-Husband's death, his surviving parent received
and spent almost all of the proceeds of the insurance policy without Ex-
Wife's knowledge. Although Sister was aware of the shenanigans regard-
ing the life insurance policy, she did not inform Ex-Wife. When these
facts came to light, Ex-Wife sued. The trial court found that Ex-Husband
did not actually create a trust when he named Sister as the trustee of the
benefits because there were no definite trust terms. Nonetheless, the
court determined it had the equitable power to "remove" Sister as the
"trustee" of the benefits and "substitute" Ex-Wife as the "trustee" to
compensate Ex-Wife for the loss of the insurance proceeds. Sister ap-
pealed asserting, among other claims, that Ex-Husband had not created a
trust when he designated her as the trustee.120
The court held that Ex-Husband created a valid trust. The court began
its analysis by studying the beneficiary designation forms. In the space
for information regarding the primary beneficiary, Ex-Husband placed
his Sister's name followed by a statement that she was trustee for Chil-
dren. The court recognized that no particular form of words is required
to create a trust. The court determined that these statements were suffi-
cient inter vivos transfers to create trusts under Section 112.001 of the
Trust Code.121
The court next addressed whether the designations provided reasona-
ble certainty regarding the property, purpose, and beneficiary of the trust
so that the trust would not fail for vagueness. The court held that the
property and beneficiaries were clearly set forth. In addition, the court
determined that by naming minor beneficiaries, it was reasonably certain
that Ex-Husband intended the proceeds to be used for the general wel-
fare of Children. The comprehensive provisions of the Trust Code pro-
vided the remaining terms of the trust.122
However, the mere use of trust language will not necessarily create a
trust as in McAnally v. Friends of WCC, Inc. 123 A deed conveyed land to
named individuals "as trustees" of a cemetery. After a dispute arose, a
corporation was formed for the purpose of acquiring control and owner-
ship over the land. This corporation asserted that the original grant cre-
ated a trust. The court held that the use of the term "trustee" did not
create a trust, especially since the deed failed to name a beneficiary.
Thus, the corporation could not use the Texas Trust Code to seek
relief. 124
120. Id. at 274-76.
121. Id. at 282.
122. See id. (explaining that the trust sets forth additional specifications to allow the
trustee to know what actions to take and be held accountable for).
123. McAnally v. Friends of WCC, Inc., 113 S.W.3d 875 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no
pet.).
124. Id. at 878, 882.
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B. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
1. Termination Events
A settlor should consider providing detailed guidance with regard to
when a condition which triggers trust termination is satisfied. For exam-
ple, in Hurley v. Moody National Bank of Galveston,125 Settlor created a
testamentary trust for Beneficiary. The trust was to terminate when Ben-
eficiary either (1) reached age 35 or (2) completed his education, which-
ever occurred first, with the balance to be distributed to Beneficiary's
mother and uncle. The trust provides that Beneficiary is not considered
as completing his education so long as he is "continuing his formal educa-
tion at a recognized academic college or university which meets the ap-
proval of trustee. '126 Beneficiary notified Trustee that he had withdrawn
from college, did not intend to continue his education, and that the trust
should be terminated. The remainder beneficiaries (Mother and Uncle)
agreed. Trustee, however, did not terminate the trust because Trustee
believed that Beneficiary's dissatisfaction with higher education was only
temporary. To resolve this issue, Trustee requested a declaratory judg-
ment regarding whether the trust had terminated under its own terms.
Subsequently, Beneficiary went back to college, requested the court to
continue the trust, and explained that his original withdrawal from col-
lege and request for the trust to terminate was influenced by his heavy
use of illegal drugs. The court determined that the trust had not termi-
nated. Uncle appealed. 12 7
The appellate court affirmed. The court examined the trust, especially
its statement that the principal purpose of the trust is to provide for Ben-
eficiary's education and the Settlor's grant of broad discretion to Trustee.
The court thought it was reasonable for Trustee to view the one-and-a-
half years during which Beneficiary did not enroll in college as a mere
break in his education, not a completion of it. Settlor had not required
Beneficiary to be continuously enrolled in college. The court also noted
that Uncle had originally told Trustee the trust should not be terminated.
The court held the trust was not ambiguous, and it did not terminate on
its own terms. 128
2. Reformation
Estate of Hearn v. Hearn129 demonstrates that a person attempting to
reform a trust must have solid evidence that an agreement exists and that
there was a mistake in reducing that agreement to writing. Husband and
125. Hurley v. Moody Nat'l Bank of Galveston, 98 S.W.3d 307 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
126. Id. at 309.
127. Id. at 309-10.
128. See id. at 311 (contending that Uncle's statement was an admission by a party
opponent which proves the Trustee's correct interpretation of the trust).
129. In re Estate of Hearn v. Hearn, 101 S.W.3d at 657, 657 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2003, pet denied).
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Wife executed reciprocal wills leaving personal and household effects to
the survivor with the residuary passing to an inter vivos trust. After Hus-
band died, Husband's Children from a prior marriage unsuccessfully
claimed that Husband and Wife had executed contractual wills which
would require Wife to fund the trust with her property upon Husband's
death. Children then urged the court to reform the trust to reflect Hus-
band's alleged intent. The court refused to reform the trust. 130
The court began its analysis by identifying the two elements which
Children must satisfy before the court would reform the trust. First, there
must have been an agreement between Husband and Wife. Second, there
must have been a mutual mistake in reducing that agreement to writing.
The court expressed no opinion as to whether a unilateral mistake would
support reformation of a trust. Wife successfully negated these elements
by showing that she had never agreed to place her property in the trust
upon Husband's death. The court examined a letter from the attorney
who drafted the wills and trust and concluded that it did not even raise a
fact issue with regard to whether Wife had agreed to fund the trust with
her property when Husband died.1 31
3. Latent Ambiguity
Eckels v. Davis132 teaches that wills and trusts need to be periodically
reviewed and updated to eliminate ambiguities. Settlor established an in-
ter vivos trust identifying two accounts at a financial management com-
pany by account numbers as trust property. For internal bookkeeping
reasons, the company renumbered one of the accounts. When the trust
terminated, the remainder beneficiaries asserted that they were entitled
to the funds from the renumbered account. However, the beneficiaries of
Settlor's will claimed that they were entitled to the funds because the
renumbered account was not covered by the trust. The trial court held
that the renumbered account passed under the terms of the trust.133
The appellate court affirmed. The renumbering of the account created
a latent ambiguity, that is, an ambiguity which is not apparent from the
face of the trust but which arises when the trustee attempts to carry out
the terms of the trust. Extrinsic evidence is admissible to resolve a latent
ambiguity. The evidence was clear that the change in the account number
was the unilateral act of the company and thus, did not reflect any change
in Settlor's intent to have this account pass under the terms of the
trust.'
3 4
130. Id. at 659.
131. Id. at 662-63.
132. Eckels v. Davis, 111 S.W.3d 687 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied).
133. Id. at 691-93.
134. See id. at 695-97 (explaining that extrinsic evidence conclusively shows the settlor's
intent was to move assets into a living trust and give remaining assets, less $600,000, to the
settlor's children and his wife).
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C. INVESTMENT AND MANAGEMENT STANDARD OF CARE
1. Generally
Until January 1, 2004, the propriety of the trustee's investments were
judged according to the prudent person standard. 135 A trustee was re-
quired to exercise the degree of care and level of skill that a person of
ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with that person's own prop-
erty. The trustee was required to consider three main factors in selecting
an investment. First, the trustee examined the safety of the investment.
Risky or speculative investments were not allowed. Second, the trustee
determined the investment's potential to appreciate in value. Third, the
trustee evaluated the income which the investment was expected to gen-
erate. Prior law also contained a portfolio-type provision in that the de-
termination of whether a trustee acted prudently was based on a
consideration of how all the assets of the trust were invested collectively
rather than by examining each investment individually.' 36
The Texas version of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act took effect on
January 1, 2004.137 Under this "total asset management" approach, the
appropriateness of investments is based on the performance of the entire
trust portfolio. A prudent investor could decide that the best investment
strategy is to select some assets that appreciate and others that earn in-
come as well as some investments that are rock-solid balanced with some
that have a reasonable degree of risk. In selecting investments, the trus-
tee should incorporate risk and return objectives that are reasonably
suited to the trust. Different trusts may call for different investment ap-
proaches depending on the trustee's abilities, the trust's purposes, the
beneficiary's needs, and other circumstances.1 38
2. Diversification
The new legislation codifies the trustee's duty to diversify to spread the
risk so that if one investment goes bad, the entire trust does not suffer.
However, the trustee is not required to diversify if the circumstances
demonstrate the purposes of the trust would be better served without
diversifying.1 39 For example, assume that Settlor created a trust contain-
ing Settlor's heirloom jewelry and a 20,000 acre farm that has been in
Settlor's family for almost 200 years. At the termination of the trust, all
remaining trust property passes to Settlor's children. Should Trustee sell
some of this property to create a balanced portfolio of investments? Re-
taining all trust property in two assets of this type is certainly not a proper
diversification. On the other hand, it is reasonable to conclude that Set-
tlor wanted the heirloom jewelry and the farm to remain in the trust so
135. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.056 (Vernon 1995), repealed by TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 113.056 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
136. Id.
137. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 117.001-.012 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
138. Id. § 117.004.
139. Id. § 117.005.
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they would pass to Settlor's children and thus Trustee may retain the as-
sets without diversification.
3. Asset Retention
The trustee must review trust assets within a reasonable time after ac-
cepting the trust or receiving trust property. The trustee must then bring
the trust property into compliance with the prudent investor rule.140 This
is a significant change from prior Texas law which permitted the trustee
to retain the initial trust property without diversification and without lia-
bility for loss or depreciation. 141
4. Loyalty
The new legislation codifies the principle that the trustee's loyalty is to
the beneficiaries. 142 Accordingly, social investing may be problematic, es-
pecially if the returns from a "politically correct" investment are lower
than from other investments. Social investment refers to the considera-
tion of factors other than the monetary safety of the investments and
their potential to earn income and appreciate in value. Examples of these
types of factors include a company's handling of environmental matters,
whether a company does business with countries with policies that do not
protect human rights, whether a company employs and pays substandard
wages to workers in foreign countries, and the political party affiliation of
the company's leadership.
5. Delegation of Management and Investment Functions
The traditional rule regarding delegation of powers is that the trustee
may delegate mere ministerial duties but may not delegate discretionary
acts. Investment of trust property was deemed a discretionary act and
thus not subject to delegation. In 1999, Texas altered this rule and al-
lowed the trustee to delegate investment decisions to an investment
agent.143 The statute required the trustee to send written notice to the
beneficiaries at least thirty days before entering into an agreement to
delegate investment decisions to an investment agent. Generally, the
trustee remained responsible for the agent's investment decisions. How-
ever, the trustee could have avoided liability for the investment agent's
decisions if all of the relatively strenuous criteria specified in the statute
were satisfied. 144
The new legislation takes a very different approach. The trustee may
delegate any investment or management decision provided a prudent
140. Id. § 117.006.
141. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.003 (Vernon 1995), repealed by TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 117.006 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
142. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 117.007 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
143. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.060 (Vernon 1995), repealed by TEX. PROP. CODE




trustee of similar skills could properly delegate under the same circum-
stances. Of course, the trustee must exercise reasonable care, skill, and
caution in selecting and reviewing the agent's actions. In the usual case,
the trustee is not liable to the beneficiaries or the trust for the decisions
or actions of the agent. 145
6. Language Invoking Prudent Investor Standard
Certain phrases in trust instruments are deemed to trigger the prudent
investor standard. Note that some of these phrases which invoke the pru-
dent investor standard clearly appear to invoke a much different standard
(e.g., "prudent person rule"). 146
D. DISCRETION OF TRUSTEE
A support trust should clearly indicate whether the trust "may,"
"4must," or "may not" consider the beneficiary's other resources in deter-
mining whether to make a distribution. In other words, is the trust to
provide a minimum level of support and anything the beneficiary has or
acquires is irrelevant, or is the trust to provide a safety net if the benefici-
ary's other resources and income are inadequate? Failure to do so may
cause problems such as those in the case of In re Estate of Dillard.147
Settlor granted Trustee of a testamentary trust the ability to make distri-
butions of principal to Beneficiary (who happened to be the same person
as Trustee) if Beneficiary "in the discretion of the Trustee,... should be
in need of additional funds for maintenance and support." 148 Trustee/
Beneficiary claimed that his discretion was not limited to situations where
his other resources were inadequate. Both the trial and appellate court
disagreed.149
The court held the trust was not ambiguous and that Settlor's intent
was clear that principal distributions were allowed only if Beneficiary ac-
tually needed the additional funds for maintenance and support. The
trust did not give Trustee "utter discretion to do that which the trustee
may care to at any given moment.... [Trustee] must exercise [discretion]
only after considering the beneficiary's needs, age, condition, separate re-
sources, the size of the trust estate, health, and the like. '150
145. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 117.011 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
146. See id. § 117.012 (stating the use of the phrases "prudent man rule," "prudent trus-
tee rule," "prudent person rule," and "prudent investor rule" in the trust will permit any
strategy or investment allowed under this chapter).
147. In re Estate of Dillard, 98 S.W.3d 386 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2003, pet. denied).
148. Id. at 389.
149. See id. at 394-95 (explaining the trustee's discretion is not absolute, but it must be
utilized only after considering factors such as the estate's size, needs of the beneficiary, and
conditions of the estate).
150. Id. at 395.
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E. ALLOCATION OF RECEIPTS AND EXPENSES BETWEEN PRINCIPAL
AND INCOME-TRUSTS IN GENERAL
Effective January 1, 2004, the Texas version of the 1997 Uniform Prin-
cipal and Income Act (UPIA) will mandate how a trustee allocates re-
ceipts and expenses between principal and income unless the trust
instrument provides otherwise. 151 This Act reflects the most significant
change in allocation rules in many decades. Some of the key provisions
of this new legislation are reviewed below.
1. Allocation Methods
The trustee has three ways to determine how to allocate receipts and
expenses between income and principal. First, the settlor may have pro-
vided instructions in the trust instrument. These instructions may state
specific allocation rules or may merely give the trustee discretion to make
the allocation. 152 An allocation in accordance with the UPIA's rules by a
trustee who has discretionary authority is presumed to be fair and reason-
able to all beneficiaries. 153 Second, if the instrument is silent, the trustee
must apply the rules in Chapter 116.154 Third, if neither the instrument
nor the statute specifies the proper method of allocation, the trustee must
allocate to principal. 155 This last rule is a significant departure from prior
law which provided that the trustee must allocate in a "reasonable and
equitable" manner if both the instrument and statute were silent.156
2. Trustee's Adjustment Power
Section 116.005 is the most innovative provision of the 1997 UPIA.
Consider the following example: Settlor created a testamentary trust re-
quiring trust income to be paid to Daughter for life with the remainder to
Granddaughter. The trust corpus consists primarily of real estate which is
appreciating in value at about fifteen percent per year due to its proxim-
ity to the edge of a growing city. The land is still subject to a multiple-
year lease which Settlor signed with Tenant many years ago. The rent
Tenant pays is significantly below market value and is insufficient to sup-
port Daughter as Settlor intended. May Trustee sell part of the land and
allocate a portion of the profits to income?
Under traditional trust rules, Trustee could not allocate any of the prof-
its from the sale of the real estate to income. Granddaughter has a right
to the principal and appreciation belongs to the principal. However, Sec-
tion 116.005 grants the trustee the power to adjust between principal and
income under specified circumstances. The adjustment power section is
151. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 116.001-.206 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
152. Id. § 116.004(a)(1)-(2).
153. Id. § 116.004(b).
154. Id. § 116.004(a)(3).
155. Id. § 116.004(a)(4).
156. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.101(a)(3) (Vernon 1995), repealed by TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 116.004 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
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quite lengthy and requires Trustee to consider a variety of factors such
the settlor's intent and the identity and circumstances of the beneficiaries.
In this example, it appears that Settlor established the trust to provide for
Daughter, and Settlor's intent would be frustrated if Trustee did not allo-
cate some of the profits to income to provide Daughter with an appropri-
ate level of support.
157
The adjustment power has proven to be an extremely controversial as-
pect of the 1997 UPIA because of its tremendous departure from tradi-
tional law, the fear that trustees may abuse the power, and the potential
of a beneficiary suing a trustee if the trustee does not exercise the adjust-
ment power in the beneficiary's favor. Accordingly, many of the states
enacting the 1997 version of the Act have omitted the adjustment provi-
sions or have altered or restricted them in some way.
Section 116.006 provides the trustee with the option of seeking court
approval of an adjustment between principal and income under Sec-
tion 116.005. The Texas version of this section differs from the uniform
version in that it includes additional protections for the beneficiaries.1 58
3. Non-Charitable Unitrusts
To avoid the accounting hassle of allocating receipts and expenses be-
tween the income and remainder interests, as well as to reduce the inher-
ent conflict of interest between current and future beneficiaries, some
settlors adopt a unitrust or total return approach. The current beneficiary
of a unitrust is entitled to receive a fixed percentage of the value of the
trust property annually. The current beneficiary may or may not also be
entitled to additional distributions. Under a unitrust, both beneficiaries
have the same goal-they want the value of the property in the trust to
increase. It does not matter to them whether the increase in value is due
to receipts of traditionally nominated income (e.g., interest or rent) or
principal (i.e., appreciation). All increases inure to the benefit of all ben-
eficiaries. Likewise, all beneficiaries share in the expenses regardless of
their usual characterization. Section 116.007 assists unitrusts to qualify
for various tax benefits. The UPIA does not contain an equivalent
provision. 159
4. Termination of Income Interest
Section 116.051 provides guidance to the trustee for determining and
distributing net income after (1) a decedent dies or (2) an income interest
in a trust ends. In a significant departure from prior law, unpaid pecuni-
ary gifts in a will (either outright or in trust) begin to earn interest one
157. See generally TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 116.005 (Vernon Supp. 2004) (explaining
the trustee's power to adjust trust assets between income and principal).
158. See generally id. (listing factors to consider the extent of power conferred to the
trustee to make adjustments).
159. Compare TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 116.007 (Vernon Supp. 2004), with TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 117.001-.012 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
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year after the decedent dies rather than one year after the court grants
letters testamentary. 160 In another change, the trustee may now allocate
interest on estate taxes to either principal or income rather than only
against principal. 161
5. Zero-Coupon Bonds
The trustee should allocate interest received on money lent (e.g., a cer-
tificate of deposit) to income. In a change from prior law, a trustee no
longer may allot to income the increase in value of a bond which pays no
interest but appreciates in value (e.g., U.S. Series E savings bonds and
other zero-coupon bonds) unless its maturity date is within one year after
acquisition. 162
6. Insubstantial Allocations
Under many circumstances, the new rules free the trustee from the ob-
ligation of allocating insubstantial amounts. Instead, the entire amount is
allocated to principal. 163 The section, however, does not define "insub-
stantial." Thus, a $1,000 receipt could be substantial for some trusts but
insubstantial for others depending on the size of the trust corpus.164
7. Annuity Allocations
The new provisions provide guidance for a trustee when allocating re-
ceipts from deferred compensation plans, annuities, and similar arrange-
ments such as IRAs. Generally, each year, receipts are allocated to
income until they total four percent of the asset's fair market value.
Amounts in excess of four percent are allocated to principal.1 65 The
Texas version of this section deviates significantly from the UPIA which
provides that ten percent of each distribution is income with the remain-
ing ninety percent passing to principal. 166
8. Liquidating Asset Allocation
A liquidating or wasting asset is one which goes down in value as it is
used to produce income beyond what would be considered mere depreci-
ation from normal use and age. Examples of these types of assets include
leaseholds, patents, copyrights, and royalties The trustee must now allo-
160. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 378B(f) (Vernon 2003), repealed by TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 116.051 (Vernon Supp. 2004). But see TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 378B(f) (Vernon
2003) (amended by 2003 Legislature with a technical change that arguably leaves the prior
law still affective).
161. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 116.051 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
162. Id. § 116.163. Cf. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.105(b), repealed by TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 116.163 (Vernon Supp. 2004) (explaining the income beneficiary at the time
of the increase of the bond's value is the beneficiary of distributions).
163. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 116.171 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
164. Id.
165. Id. § 116.172.




cate ten percent of each receipt to income and the remaining ninety per-
cent to principal. 167 This allocation is significantly different from prior
Texas law which provided that receipts up to five percent of the asset's
value each year were income with any excess being principal. 168
9. Oil & Gas Royalty Allocation
Traditionally under Texas law, oil and gas royalties were allocated sev-
enty-two-and-one-half percent to income and twenty-seven-and-one-half
percent to principal. These percentages were based on former federal
income tax rules which used these percentages for depletion allowances.
The UPIA gives only ten percent to income with the remaining ninety
percent to principal. Note how unfair this would be to a beneficiary who
is receiving seventy-two-and-one-half percent and then discovers that the
new law cuts the percentage way down to ten percent. Texas deviates
from the UPIA by requiring the trustee to allocate these receipts "equita-
bly."1 69 In addition, the trustee may use the prior allocation percentages
if the trust owned the natural resource on January 1, 2004.170
10. Timber Allocation
Timber is unlike other natural resources because it is renewable; the
trees will grow back. The time it will take the trees to regrow, however,
depends on the type of trees. For example, some varieties of pine trees
may be ready to harvest in twenty years while other trees such as red-
woods may take over a century. Consequently, it is difficult to create a
precise allocation rule. The new law explains that receipts are income if
the timber removed does not exceed the rate of new growth, but receipts
become principal if they are from timber in excess of the regrowth
rate. 171 This provision provides more guidance than prior law which
merely instructed the trustee to do what was reasonable and equitable. 172
11. Non-Income Earning Property
The trustee should not retain property that does not earn income ab-
sent express permission in the trust instrument unless it is prudent to re-
tain it under Chapter 117. Although some nonproductive assets, such as
collectible items and unleased land, may have the potential of signifi-
cantly appreciating in value, the retention of nonproductive property usu-
ally would violate the trustee's duty of fairness to the income
beneficiaries. Under prior law, the trustee was required to promptly sell
underproductive property which meant property that did not earn at least
167. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 116.173 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
168. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.109 (Vernon 1995), repealed by TEX, PROP. CODE
ANN. § 116.173 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
169. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 116.174 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
170. Compare id., with TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 117.001-.012 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
171. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 116.175 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
172. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN, § 113.108 (Vernon 1995), repealed by TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 116.175 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
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one percent of its value per year, assuming the trustee was under a duty
to sell either according to the terms of the trust or because it was impru-
dent to retain the property. 173 Once the trustee sold the underproductive
property, the trustee was often required to allocate a portion of the sale
proceeds to income as delayed income to make up for the income the
trust should have earned had this portion of the trust been placed in in-
come-producing investments.1 74
The new legislation dispenses with the allocation of delayed income.
Now, the proceeds from the sale or other disposition of a trust asset are
principal without regard to the amount of income the asset produced.
However, the trustee does retain the duty to make property productive
for marital deduction trusts to make certain they continue to qualify for
favored tax treatment. 175
12. Expense Allocation
The new legislation makes two significant changes from prior law.
First, trustee compensation is now apportioned one-half against principal
and one-half income while former law permitted the trustee to allocate
compensation on a just and equitable basis. Second, expenses from ac-
countings and judicial proceeds are also allocated equally while under
prior law all these expenses were charged against income.1 76
13. Depreciation Allocation
A trustee may make transfers from income to principal to compensate
for the depreciation of the principal. 177 Under prior law, however, a trus-
tee was required to make a reasonable allowance for depreciation. 178
F. ALLOCATION OF RECEIPTS AND EXPENSES BETWEEN PRINCIPAL
AND INCOME-CHARITABLE TRUSTS
The 2003 legislature established a procedure to permit the trustee of a
charitable trust to make adjustments between principal and income
within certain parameters.1 79 The Legislature did not correlate this sec-
tion with the passage of the Uniform Principal and Income Act which
also contains a procedure for making adjustments between principal and
income. Accordingly, it is unclear whether charitable trustees are re-
173. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.110 (Vernon 1995), repealed by TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 116.176 (b) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
174. Id.
175. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 116.176(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
176. Compare id. § 116.201, with TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.111 (Vernon 1995), re-
pealed by TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 116.201 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
177. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 116.203 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
178. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.111 (a)(2) (Vernon 1995), repealed by TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 116.203 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
179. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.0211 (Vernon Supp. 2004). Note the unusual effec-
tive date provision which provides that this section applies only to a "demand for an ac-
counting" which is made on or after September 1, 2003. The legislature probably intended
this limitation to apply only to Section 3 which deals with accountings. See id.
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stricted to Section 113.0211 or whether they may use the Uniform Act
procedure as well.
G. EXCULPATORY CLAUSES
The Texas Legislature codified rules regarding the enforceability of ex-
culpatory clauses in trusts.
1. General Limitation on Enforceability
A settlor is prohibited from relieving a trustee of liability for a breach
of trust committed (1) in bad faith, (2) intentionally, or (3) with reckless
indifference to the interest of the beneficiary. In addition, the settlor may
not permit the trustee to retain any profit derived from a breach of
trust.180 An exculpatory clause is ineffective to the extent the provision
was included in the trust because of an abuse by the trustee of a fiduciary
duty to or confidential relationship with the settlor.181
2. Chapter 142 Management Trusts
An exculpatory provision in a Chapter 142 management trust will be
enforceable only if the following two requirements are satisfied:
(1) The exculpatory provision is limited to specific facts and circum-
stances unique to the property of that trust and is not applicable
generally to the trust.
(2) The court creating or modifying the trust makes a specific find-
ing that there is clear and convincing evidence the exculpatory
provision is in the best interests of the beneficiary of the trust.182
This new requirement is a reaction to the Texas Supreme Court opinion
in Texas Commerce Bank, N.A. v. Grizzle,183 in which the court enforced
a boilerplate exculpatory clause in a Chapter 142 trust.184
3. 867 Trusts
Rules analogous to those for Chapter 142 management trusts now gov-
ern Section 867 of the Probate Code trusts as well. 185
H. ACCOUNTINGS BY TRUSTEE
1. Deadline After Beneficiary Request
Rather than having a "reasonable time" to render an accounting after a
beneficiary's written request, a trustee must now provide the accounting
on or before the ninetieth day after the trustee receives the demand un-
180. Id. § 113.059(c).
181. Id. § 113.059(d).
182. Id. § 142.005(j).
183. Tex. Commerce Bank v. Grizzle, 96 S.W.3d 240 (Tex. 2002).
184. Id. at 256. See also Clifton v. Hopkins, 107 S.W.3d 755, 761 (Tex. App.-Waco
2003, no pet.) (acknowledging the Texas Supreme Court-affirmed exculpatory clauses are
not prohibited by public policy and valid under the Trust Code).
185. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 868(c) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
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less a court order provides for a longer period. 186
2. Recovery of Costs for Suit to Compel Accounting
If the beneficiary is successful in a suit to compel an accounting, the
court now has the discretion to award all or part of the court costs and all
the beneficiary's reasonable and necessary attorney's fees against the
trustee in either the trustee's individual or representative capacity. Note
that the section does not seem to permit the court to award only a part of
the attorney's fees; it appears to be an "all or nothing" situation unlike
with regard to court costs where the court has the discretion to award "all
or part. '187
3. Contents of Accounting
A trustee should render a complete accounting in the form mandated
by the Trust Code. For example, in the case of In re Estate of Dillard,188
the court ordered Trustee to provide an accounting in the form required
by Section 113.152 of the Trust Code. Trustee submitted an accounting
and the court approved it. The appellate court, however, held that the
trial court erred in so doing because the accounting did not contain all the
items enumerated in the Code.189
I. REMOVAL
1. In Court's Discretion
a. Discretionary Nature of Court's Decision
Despite the use of the word "may" in Section 113.082 of the Property
Code, Texas courts have held that they must remove a trustee for the
specific reasons enumerated in the statute such as for materially violating
the trust or becoming insolvent.190 The 2003 legislature changed the stat-
ute by adding the phrase "in its discretion" after the term "may" to make
it clear that whether or not to remove a trustee is always a discretionary
decision of the court. 191
b. For Other Cause
The court will consider a wide array of factors in determining whether
it is proper for a court to remove a trustee "for other cause" as in Bar-
186. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.151(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004) (applicable only to a
demand for an accounting made on or after September 1, 2003).
187. See id. (stating the court may award "all or part of the costs of court" and all
attorneys' fees).
188. In re Estate of Dillard, 98 S.W.3d 386, 386 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2003, pet
denied).
189. Id. at 397-98.
190. See Akin v. Dahl, 661 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex. 1983).
191. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.082 (Vernon Supp. 2004). Note the unusual effec-
tive date provision which provides that this section applies only to a "demand for an ac-
counting" which is made on or after September 1, 2003. The legislature probably intended
this limitation to apply only to Section 3 which deals with accountings. See id.
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rientos v. Nava.192 After holding that Ex-Husband had created valid
trusts, the appellate court examined the facts and determined that they
were adequate to support the trial court's decision to remove Sister as
trustee under Section 113.082(a)(3) of the Trust Code "for other cause."
The court conducted an extensive evaluation of Sister's conduct and
agreed Sister had not made reasonably prudent decisions regarding the
investment of trust funds, did not have the ability to manage them for
Children's best interest, and had hostility which interfered with her ability
to manage the property.
19 3
2. Additional Listed Ground
The court may remove a trustee "if the trustee fails to make an ac-
counting that is required [either] by law or by the terms of the trust.' 1 94
3. Non-Ground
"A trustee of a charitable trust may not be removed solely on the
grounds that the trustee exercised the trustee's power to adjust between
principal and income under [new Property Code Section] 113.0211." 195
J. SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE
Barrientos v. Nava' 96 shows a person displeased with a trial court's
naming of a successor trustee will have a difficult time showing that the
trial court's decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. After holding Ex-
Husband had created valid trusts and it was proper to remove Sister, the
appellate court examined the facts and determined they were adequate to
support the trial court's decision to substitute Ex-Wife as trustee. The
court noted that Ex-Wife was the mother of the beneficiaries and thus in
the best position to ascertain their needs. In addition, Ex-Wife's conduct
demonstrated that she had the ability to invest the property on behalf of
Children. 197
V. OTHER ESTATE PLANNING MATTERS
A. DIVORCE AND BENEFICIARY DESIGNATIONS
In Keen v. Weaver,198 Husband named Wife as the beneficiary of his
annuity plan which was governed by ERISA. Husband and Wife di-
vorced. Wife waived any interest in the plan in the divorce settlement
agreeing the plan would be Husband's sole property. Husband died thir-
teen years after divorcing Wife without changing the beneficiary designa-
192. See Barrientos v. Nava, 94 S.W.3d 270 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no
pet.) and supra text accompanying note 119.
193. Id. at 288.
194. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.082(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
195. Id. § 113.082(c).
196. See Barrientos, 94 S.W.3d at 270 and supra text accompanying note 119.
197. Id. at 289-90.
198. Keen v. Weaver, 121 S.W.3d 721 (Tex. 2003), cert. denied 124 S. Ct. 808 (2003).
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tion. Relying on the beneficiary designation, the annuity company began
paying Wife. Husband's Mother, the contingent beneficiary, claimed the
proceeds. The trial court rejected Mother's claim and held Wife was enti-
tled to the proceeds.1 99 The appellate court reversed holding that Texas
redesignation statute (Section 9.302 of the Family Code), although pre-
empted by ERISA under Engelhoff v. Engelhoff,20 0 applied as federal
common-law and thus prevented Wife, a former spouse, from receiving
the annuity.20 1
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court in a five to four
decision but based its decision on the Wife's waiver, not the redesignation
statute. The court explained that ERISA does not prohibit a plan admin-
istrator from recognizing a beneficiary's waiver, disclaimer, or other repu-
diation of plan benefits. Because Wife's waiver of her interests in the
plan was specific, knowing, and voluntary, the court deemed it to be en-
forceable under federal common-law. Accordingly, the plan's benefits
are payable to Mother, the contingent beneficiary. 20 2
The four justice dissent explains that ERISA clearly preempts state law
and that there is no basis to distinguish between the Texas redesignation
statute and Wife's waiver. The opinion explains that the majority
is unable to supply any reason, real or imagined, why ERISA would
explicitly require plans to be administered according to their terms,
preempt state law to assure that end, and then reincorporate state
law into federal common-law so that plans are not administered ac-
cording to their terms, thereby making the express statutory lan-
guage [of ERISA] simply illusory.20 3
This decision reflects the court's reluctance to conform with the law as
pronounced by the United States Supreme Court when to do so would be
contrary to Texas law and public policy. The United States Supreme
Court indicated that plan administrators should not have to master the
relevant laws of fifty states. The same logic would apply to how each
state determines the contents of federal common-law. Although the legal
basis of the Texas court's decision is problematic, it carries out the highly
likely intent of Husband, albeit unexpressed, to not have annuity pay-
ments made to an ex-spouse from whom he had been divorced for thir-
teen years. This issue is certain to arise repeatedly and should be
addressed by an amendment to ERISA which expressly voids the desig-
nation of an ex-spouse made prior to divorce.
B. STATUTORY PROBATE COURT JURISDICTION
The 2003 legislature enacted three bills impacting statutory probate
199. Id. at 723-23.
200. Engelhoff v. Engelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
201. Weaver v. Keen, 43 S.W.3d 537, 544 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001), affd on other
grounds, Keen v. Weaver, 121 S.W.3d 721 (Tex. 2003).
202. Keen, 121 S.W.3d at 728-29.
203. Id. at 730 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
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court jurisdiction. 20 4 Some of the changes are technical in nature and
enhance the readability and clarity of the Probate Code's jurisdiction pro-
visions which effect decedents' estates and guardianships. Unfortunately,
other provisions further complicate the already confusing nature of statu-
tory probate court jurisdiction.
Perhaps the most significant issue is the determination of proper juris-
diction for a proceeding involving a testamentary trust. Below are five
possibilities:
(1) If the estate is still pending in the statutory probate court which
probated the will creating the trust, the action must be brought
in that court. If the estate is not pending, the action would be
brought in the appropriate district court.
(2) Regardless of whether the estate is still pending in the statutory
probate court which probated the will creating the trust, the ac-
tion must be brought in that court. This could result in the pro-
bate court hearing actions regarding testamentary trusts many
decades after the estate was closed.
(3) The action must be brought in the statutory probate court in the
county which has venue as determined by the Trust Code regard-
less of the county in which the will was originally probated.
(4) The action may be brought either (a) in the district court or (b)
in the statutory probate court if the estate is still pending or if
the personal representative of an estate is a party to the
proceeding.
(5) The action must be brought in the district court unless the estate
is still pending in a statutory probate court or if the personal
representative of an estate is a party to the proceeding. 20 5
C. MULTIPLE-PARTY ACCOUNTS
1. Joint Account
As In re Estate of Dillard20 6 demonstrates, the attorney should person-
ally inspect all signature cards and account contracts to make certain they
are signed, unambiguously create precisely the type of account the client
desires, and clearly reference the current account numbers. Husband and
Wife opened an account with a brokerage firm and signed an agreement
containing clear survivorship language sufficient under Section 439 of the
Probate Code. The agreement, however, expressly referred to a different
account number than the number on the account when Wife died. The
trial court found the current account was also controlled by the survivor-
ship agreement.20 7
204. Tex. H.B. 4 § 3.05, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003); Tex. H.B. 1470 §§ 2-6, 33, 78th Leg., R.S.
(2003); Tex. H.B. 1473 §§ 1-4, 16, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003).
205. Glenn M. Karisch, 2003 Legislative Update, available at http://
www.texasprobate.com/031eg/03updatepaper.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
206. In re Estate of Dillard, 98 S.W.3d 386, 386 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2003, pet
denied).
207. Id. at 396-97.
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The appellate court agreed. The evidence showed that the two num-
bers actually referred to the same account. The numbers changed when
the account was transferred from the brokerage's office in one city to an
office in another city. Accordingly, the funds in the account were still
governed by the original agreement containing the survivorship
language.20 8
2. P.O.D. Account
The importance of careful signature card inspection is also shown by
Parker v. JPMorgan Chase Bank.20 9 Depositor opened accounts in paya-
ble on death (P.O.D.) form in favor of Beneficiary. However, Depositor
did not sign the account contracts. After Depositor's death, Bank paid
the proceeds to the executor of Depositor's estate. Beneficiary brought
suit against Bank asserting the Bank made the payments in error. The
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Bank.2 10
The appellate court affirmed. The court held that Depositor did not
create P.O.D. accounts because she did not sign written agreements cre-
ating the P.O.D. feature as required by Section 439(b) of the Probate
Code. 211
The court also rejected Beneficiary's argument that Bank had no stand-
ing to raise the lack of Depositor's signature because of Section 448 of the
Probate Code, which eliminates a financial institution's protection from
liability if it receives written notice from a party able to request present
payment that withdrawals are not to be allowed. In this case, Beneficiary
had no right to request withdrawals because the account was not a valid
P.O.D. account.2 12
3. Convenience Accounts
The rules governing convenience accounts were modernized to permit
multiple parties and multiple convenience signers on the same account. 213
This change enhances the usefulness of convenience accounts. For exam-
ple, a husband and wife may be parties and designate a child as a conve-
nience signer or a parent may designate several children as convenience
signers. The Uniform Single-Party or Multiple-Party Account Selection
Form Notice was revised to reflect this change. 214
208. Id.
209. Parker v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 95 S.W.3d 428 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
2002, no pet.).
210. Id. at 429-30.
211. Id. at 431-32.
212. Id. at 432.
213. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439A (Vernon Supp. 2004) (effective only with respect





The 2003 legislature clarified the rights of creditors against multiple-
party accounts. No multiple-party account is effective against the claim
of a secured creditor who has a lien on the account. Any party, except a
convenience signer to a convenience account, may use the account as col-
lateral without the joinder of any of the other parties. If the secured
creditor is a financial institution, the creditor must give written notice
sent by certified mail that the account was used as collateral to the other
party within thirty days of perfection. However, notice need not be given
to parties who have no current ownership rights such as P.O.D. payees,
trust account beneficiaries, and convenience signers.215
D. POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
The 2003 legislature codified various aspects of the law governing the
exercise of powers of appointment. Unless the power of appointment ex-
pressly provides otherwise, the donee of a power of appointment may do
the following things when exercising the power:
(1) Appoint present, future, or both present and future interests.
(2) Impose conditions and limitations on the appointment.
(3) Impose restraints on alienation.
(4) Appoint interests to a trustee for the benefit of one or more ob-
jects of the power.
(5) Create any right existing under the common-law.
(6) Grant the objects of the power of appointment the power to ap-
point the property provided that these powers of appointment
must be exercisable only in favor of the objects of the power who
would have been permissible objects under the original donee's
power.
(7) If the donee has the power to appoint outright to the object of
the power, exercise the power to give a power of appointment to
the object of the original power. The donee of the original
power becomes the donor of the second generation power.
There are no restrictions on the identity of the objects of the
second generation power; in other words, these objects do not
have to be permissible objects of the original power of
appointment.216
E. LIFE INSURANCE
Many employers purchase life insurance policies on employees. Unless
the employee qualifies as a key employee whose death would cause a
financial hardship to the employer, the employer lacks an insurable inter-
est and thus the employee's estate would have a claim to the proceeds.
Thus, a personal representative should check with the deceased's employ-
215. Id. § 442 (effective only for multiple-party accounts created on or after September
1, 2003).
216. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 181.081-.083 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
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ers, both present and past, to ascertain the existence of such a policy. The
case of Torrez v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. is instructive. 217 Employer pur-
chased a life insurance policy on Employee naming itself as the benefici-
ary. When Employee died in 1996, Employer collected the proceeds of
the policy. Executor of Employee's estate gained knowledge of this pol-
icy in December 2001 and filed suit approximately three months later
claiming that Employer did not have an insurable interest in Employee's
life and thus requested that the court impose a constructive trust on the
proceeds. Employer argued that Executor's claim was barred by limita-
tions and the trial court agreed.218
The appellate court reversed and remanded for a trial on the merits.
The court agreed with Executor's assertion that the statute of limitations
was tolled until Executor discovered the existence of the policy because
the policy was inherently undiscoverable. The court rejected Employer's
claim that Executor had a duty to ask Employer whether it had pur-
chased a life insurance policy on Employee's life. Accordingly, the trial
court's granting of a summary judgment was improper because Executor
filed suit within a few months of the policy's discovery. 219
F. DELIVERY OF DEED
Delivery of a deed to a third party to be delivered to the donee after
the donor's death is usually not a prudent estate planning tool because of
the uncertainty and litigation it is likely to produce as in Rothrock v.
Rothrock.220 Settlor established a trust which included Settlor's resi-
dence. Settlor served as the trustee of the trust. In 1977, Settlor, in both
his individual and representative capacities, signed a deed conveying the
residence to a corporation wholly owned by Settlor's Wife. Settlor gave
the deed to Wife but told her not to record it until Settlor died. Twenty
years later, Wife's child by a prior marriage heard rumors that Settlor
wanted Wife to return the deed. Wife's child found the deed and gave it
to an attorney for safekeeping. Settlor filed a copy of the deed and an
affidavit explaining that he had not delivered the deed, and the deed was
void. After Settlor's death, the original deed was properly filed. Benefi-
ciaries of the trust successfully sued to recover the residence for the
trust.
22 1
The appellate court reversed. Settlor delivered the deed to Wife, a
third party, with instructions to record it upon his death. There was no
evidence that he reserved the right to recall the deed. The court held that
the evidence conclusively established that Settlor intended to convey to
the grantee corporation a future interest in the residence contingent on
217. Torrez v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 118 S.W.3d 817 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003,
pet. filed).
218. Id. at 819.
219. Id. at 820-22.
220. Rothrock v. Rothrock, 104 S.W.3d 135 (Tex. App.-Waco 2003, pet. denied).
221. Id. at 137-38.
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Settlor predeceasing Wife. Thus delivery of the deed, albeit to a third
party, was effective as a matter of law. Settlor may not undo the transac-
tion merely because he later had a change of heart.222
G. DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY
Agents under a durable power of attorney must be informed that they
are subject to fiduciary duties toward the principal even if they do not
exercise any authority under the power of attorney as explained in Vogt v.
Warnock.22 3 Principal designated Agent as his durable power of attor-
ney. Agent knew about her appointment, but she never exercised any
authority which Principal granted to her. Later, Principal made many
gifts to Agent and paid her to manage his personal and financial affairs.
Some of these gifts were of property Principal had originally placed in a
revocable trust in favor of Son. Agent was also named as the primary
beneficiary of Principal's will. After Principal died, Executor filed suit
against Agent alleging breach of fiduciary duty under the durable power
of attorney. The trial court found that some transfers were fair while
others were unfair and therefore were set aside. Agent appealed.224
The appellate court held that as a matter of law Agent stood in a fiduci-
ary capacity to Principal even though she never acted under the durable
power of attorney. Accordingly, Agent had the burden to prove that all
of the Principal's transfers to her were fair. However, the court agreed
with Agent that it was unreasonable for the jury to conclude that certain
gifts were unfair to Principal. Instead, the evidence was clear that all
transfers were fair. There was no evidence showing that Principal did not
understand his actions, was acting under undue influence, or that Agent
exerted any pressure on him to make the transfers. It was irrelevant that
the transactions were not fair from Son's perspective. 225
H. SURROGATE MOTHERS
The Texas Legislature has now authorized gestational agreements be-
tween a surrogate mother and the intended parents.226 If the agreement
is properly validated, the woman who gave birth to the child will not be
treated as the child's mother. Accordingly, this child will not inherit from
or through the birth mother. Instead, the mother and father of the child
will be the intended parents, and inheritance rights will accrue
accordingly. 227
222. Id. at 138-40.
223. Vogt v. Warnock, 107 S.W.3d 778 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2003, pet. denied).
224. Id. at 780-81.
225. Id. at 784-86.





Texas now has extensive procedures which must be followed when ei-
ther (1) the attending physician wishes to cease life-sustaining treatment
but the patient's advance directive or medical agent indicates that treat-
ment should be continued, or (2) the attending physician wishes to con-
tinue life-sustaining treatment but the patient's advance directive or
medical agent indicates that treatment should be withheld.228 These pro-
cedures will assist the patient in being transferred to a facility willing to
comply with the advance directive or the agent's instructions.229
J. OUT-OF-HOSPITAL Do-NOT-RESUSCITATE ORDER
1. Individuals Authorized to Comply
The types of individuals who may honor a physician's do-not-resusci-
tate order in an out-of-hospital setting have been expanded to include (1)
licensed nurses, and (2) anyone providing health care services in an out-
of-hospital setting.230 Emergency medical services personnel responding
to a call for assistance, however, may honor only a properly executed or
issued out-of-hospital DNR order or a prescribed DNR identification
device. 231
2. Minors
An out-of-hospital do-not-resuscitate order may now be executed for a
minor by the minor's parents, guardian, or managing conservator only if
the minor has first been diagnosed by a physician as suffering from a
terminal or irreversible condition.232
228. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 166.052-.053 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
229. See id.
230. Id. § 166.102.
231. Id.
232. Id. § 166.085.
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